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10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
 11 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

12 MARIO GONZALEZ, Deceased, through his Successor
 13 in Interest, M.G.C., a minor through his mother and
 14 Next Friend Andrea Cortez, individually and as
 15 successor in interest for MARIO GONZALEZ,
 16 Deceased,

17 Plaintiffs,

18 vs.

19 CITY OF ALAMEDA, a public entity; FORMER
 20 CITY OF ALAMEDA INTERIM POLICE CHIEF
 21 RANDY FENN, in his individual and official
 22 capacities; ALAMEDA POLICE OFFICERS ERIC
 23 MCKINLEY, JAMES FISHER, and CAMERON
 24 LEAHY, and DOES 1-10, Jointly and Severally,

25 Defendants.

Case No.: 4:21-cv-09733-DMR

**DECLARATION OF LOIS P.
 HEANEY IN SUPPORT OF
 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN
 LIMINE FOR ATTORNEY
 VOIR DIRE AND A JOINT
 JURY QUESTIONNAIRE**

Trial Date: November 6, 2023

1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
2 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA)

3 I, LOIS P. HEANEY, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
4 California that the following is true and correct:

5 1. I am writing this declaration at the request of counsel for Plaintiffs in support of their
6 motion for a jury questionnaire and attorney participation in voir dire.

7 2. I am a senior trial consultant and president of NJP Litigation Consulting, Western
8 Regional Office, formerly known as National Jury Project/West, located at 1970 Broadway, Suite
9 830, Oakland, California, 94612, and I have been so employed since 1979. NJP was established in
10 1975 and is one of the nation's oldest jury consulting firms. As an organization we collaborated
11 and wrote *Jurywork: Systematic Techniques*, Thomson Reuters (2d ed. 1983 & annual
12 supplements). Its earliest version was published in 1975 under the title *The Jury System: New
13 Methods for Reducing Prejudice*, Cambridge, MA: National Jury Project.

14 3. NJP is author of several amicus curiae briefs concerned with voir dire and jury
15 selection (*People v. Williams*, 29 Cal. 3d 392 (1981), cited by the Court at 403, n.5 on voir dire and
16 brief in *Mu'Min v. Virginia*, 111 S.Ct. 1899 (1991), cited by Justice Marshall in his dissent at
17 footnote 4). We submitted an amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court in the matter of
18 *LaCaze v. State of Louisiana* (No. 16-1125) a highly publicized triple murder case in which the
19 victims were two civilian restaurant employees and an off- duty police officer. The LaCaze case
20 highlights the problem of jurors' failure to disclose important information in voir dire. In that case
21 three jurors were selected who did not reveal highly prejudicial information, including that one juror
22 was working in the police dispatch office when the crime was reported, then attended the officer's
23 funeral and that her husband served on the same police force as the victim; another failed to state
24 that he had more than 20 years of employment in various law enforcement agencies; and a third
25 juror failed to reveal that two of her brothers had been murdered in separate incidents.

26 4. I have consulted on over 1,000 criminal and civil cases on a variety of issues,
27 including *inter alia*, pretrial publicity, change of venue, jury composition, survey research, juror
28 attitudes, and the use of peremptory challenges and strike procedures in both State and Federal
court. I have been an invited speaker on jury-related subjects at a variety of legal organizations
including the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference; Northern District of California Judicial

1 Conference; Federal Judicial Center; Annual Conference of the National Association of Women
2 Judges; Florida Conference of County Court Judges; State of New York Unified Court System
3 Judicial Seminar; Association of Trial Lawyers of America; American Bar Association; Association
4 of Business Trial Lawyers; trial lawyer associations in Alaska, California, Florida, New Jersey,
5 Oregon and Washington; California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; National Association of
6 Criminal Defense Lawyers; United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division; and at many
7 law schools. I am a co-author of Jurywork: Systematic Techniques and have authored several
8 articles on jury selection, voir dire, venue, and severance issues, including an article on voir dire for
9 sexual orientation bias co-authored with Judge Helen G. Berrigan, U.S.D.C. Eastern District of
10 Louisiana ("Sexual Orientation Bias in the Court," Trial, August 1999.) I am also the author of an
11 article entitled "The Trouble with Judge-Conducted Voir Dire," CACJ Forum, 1998, Vol. 25, No. 2.

12 5. I have consulted with lawyers on a wide range of State and Federal civil and criminal
13 cases including capital cases, highly publicized cases, police abuse cases, as well as a wide range of
14 civil cases including asbestos, products liability, civil rights and complex commercial cases. My
15 case experience includes United States v. Larry Layton (Northern District of California, No. CR-80-
16 416-RFP), involving the death of Congressman Leo Ryan and the mass suicide at the People's
17 Temple in Jonestown, Guyana; United States v. Stacey Koon, et al. (Central District of California,
18 No. CR-92-686-JGD), the federal civil rights prosecution of the police officers charged in the
19 beating of Rodney King, on behalf of the United States Department of Justice; United States v.
20 Theodore Kaczynski (Eastern District of California, No. CR S-96-0259 GEB), a capital case known
21 in the media as the Unabomber; United States v. Richard Lee Tuk Chong (District of Hawaii, CR.
22 No. 98-00416 ACK), the first capital case in Hawaii in nearly 50 years; United States v. Naeem
23 Williams (District of Hawaii, No. CR-06-00079 JMS-KSC), a capital case involving an African
24 American soldier charged with killing his daughter on an Army base; United States v. Dennis
25 Cyrus, (Northern District of California, No. CR-05-00324-MMC), a gang-related triple homicide
26 capital case; United States v. Gary Watland (District of Colorado No. 1:11: CR-00038-JLK), a
27 capital case involving a prison killing at Florence Penitentiary; United States v. Ryan Payne
28 (District of Nevada No. 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PAL), a case arising out of the stand-off at the
Bundy Ranch; and New Mexico v. Sandy and Perez (Bernalillo County, New Mexico, Nos. D-202-
CR-2015-00104 and 00105), on behalf of the prosecution in a case in which law enforcement
officers were charged with murder in the death of James Boyd a homeless, mentally ill man. NJP
consultants frequently assist attorneys in civil cases in federal court including numerous cases

1 alleging civil rights violations and abuse by law enforcement officers. These include Espinosa v.
2 City and County of San Francisco (Northern District of California, No. C06-04686 JSW); Hunter v.
3 City and County of San Francisco (Northern District of California, No. CV11-4911SC); Oliver v.
4 City and County of San Francisco (Northern District of California, No. C 07 0246 JL); Smith v.
5 City of Oakland (Northern District of California, No. 3: CO5-4045); M.H. v. County of Alameda, et
6 al. (Northern District of California, No. C11-2868 JST); and May v. County of San Mateo
(Northern District of California, No. 3:16-cv-00252-LB).

7 6. I have qualified as an expert witness for change of venue and voir dire motions
8 regarding pretrial publicity, case recognition, prejudgment of guilt or innocence and media behavior
9 and voir dire procedures in:

- 10 • Government of United States of America v. Oludayo Kowole John Adeagbo;
Westminster Magistrates Court, London, England (2021) (extradition proceeding)
- 11 • California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, 2008
- 12 • South Dakota v. Wilson and Midmore, Custer, 2008
- 13 • California v. William Choyce, San Joaquin, 2007
- 14 • Wyoming v. Andrew Yellowbear, Hot Springs, 2006
- 15 • California v. Joseph Teitgen, Solano, 2003
- 16 • California v. Hai Minh Le, et al., Alameda, 2002
- 17 • California v. Robert Salazar, Los Angeles, 2002
- 18 • California v. Denny Davis, Redding, 2001

19 In addition, I testified in post-conviction hearings in Mickey v. Jill Brown, U.S. District Court,
20 Northern District, San Jose Division, 2004, habeas petition before Judge Ronald Whyte and In Re
21 Andrew Hoeft-Edenfield Habeas Corpus, Supreme Court State of California, No. S 204745, Alameda
22 County, 2014.

23 7. In 2016 I was invited to participate in a panel presentation chaired by Judge
24 Chhabria at the Northern District of California Judicial Conference on voir dire, jury questionnaires
25 and jury selection. Following that presentation, I was invited by Judge Breyer to chair a committee
26 with representatives of the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Federal Public Defender and the private
27 defense bar to draft suggested criminal jury questionnaires. Judge Breyer went on to write the
28 following:

Several years ago, at a conference of judges and attorneys from my District there was
a discussion about the use of questionnaires in criminal jury cases. Many of my colleagues
expressed reluctance to utilize this tool. They were concerned about undue consumption of
time, invasion of prospective jurors' privacy, and usurpation of the judge's prerogative to
conduct voir dire.

1 But after much consideration, the judges of my Court agreed that these concerns
2 were unfounded, and that juror questionnaires were more likely to further our obligation to
3 impanel an impartial jury than hinder it. It was recognized that absent a meaningful inquiry
4 into jurors' attitudes towards the issues implicated in criminal cases, a jury will be composed
5 of twelve individuals about whom virtually nothing of import is known.

6 After this conference our Court with the cooperation of the United States Attorney,
7 Federal Public Defender and private counsel, and the aid of the National Jury Project's able
8 expertise, developed a standard questionnaire which our judges now regularly employ.
9 Needless to say, it will become an even more essential tool for jury selection during the
10 pandemic. Our Court is grateful to the National Jury Project for its assistance in developing
11 a process which makes jury selection more transparent and just. (reprinted in *Jury Work: Systematic Techniques*, Thomson Reuters.)

12 8. Although this is not a criminal case, the present matter contains controversial and
13 sensitive issues well suited for a jury questionnaire and attorney conducted voir dire. It arises in the
14 context of national attention focused on allegations of excessive use of force by law enforcement
15 officers particularly on people of color and marginalized communities. The deaths of George Floyd
16 in Minneapolis, Michael Brown in Ferguson; Eric Garner in Staten Island; Oscar Grant in Oakland;
17 Andy Lopez in Santa Rosa; Alex Nieto in San Francisco; Michael Tyree in Santa Clara, James
18 Boyd in Albuquerque, and many others have brought the issues into the national spotlight. Several
19 of these cases involved deaths due to restraint asphyxiation and the now infamous cry of "I can't
20 breathe."

21 9. Jurors will be faced with evaluating controversial issues including the credibility of
22 police testimony, matters of responsibility and possibly compensatory and punitive damages against
23 public servants and their city. The justification for the arrest is at issue. Police are often the
24 gatekeepers when it comes to deciding whether a person in distress enters the mental health system
25 or the criminal justice system. Here there appears to be a basic question as to whether Mr.
26 Gonzalez was even in the kind of distress which warranted attention from either system.

27 10. The case calls into question the training and qualifications of officers to evaluate
28 mental distress and intoxication, their adherence to that training, their decision to forego
involvement by mental health professionals on the Mobile Crisis Team, their use of force in making
the arrest and restraint of Mr. Gonzalez. Jurors will consider whether officers had reason to detain
Mr. Gonzalez because they thought he was intoxicated due to the nearby bottles of alcohol in
combination with his slurred speech and affect, along with evidence of methamphetamine revealed
in the autopsy.

1 11. The sensitive matter of substance use, especially methamphetamine requires inquiry
 2 and is better addressed in the relative privacy of a juror questionnaire. Drug abuse and most
 3 particularly methamphetamines has had a devastating impact on many communities and families.
 4 Behavioral changes fueled by methamphetamine can include highly “erratic, aggressive, irritable or
 5 violent behavior” including psychotic episodes. While these can be horrific for the person using
 6 meth they can also highly traumatizing for those who witness it, including family members and
 7 children. In fact, meth use is a frequent basis for family intervention by Children and Family
 8 Services.

9 12. There is also a potential for racial bias to the case which may be relevant to the
 10 officers’ evaluation of Mario Gonzalez, as well as how jurors evaluate Gonzalez’s conduct and their
 11 consideration of money damages. At the time of this incident, he was unemployed and the
 12 noncustodial parent of plaintiff M.G.C., a young child. Mr. Gonzalez was an outsider to the City of
 13 Alameda, a 26-year-old Latino, who was obese, and as police learned resided in Oakland. He was a
 14 minority in the City of Alameda. The US Census 2022 population estimates for the cities of
 15 Alameda and Oakland are quite different:

	City of Alameda	Oakland
White, alone	42%	29%
Asian	31	16
Latinx	12	27
Black	6	22
All others	9	6

16 13. As a trial consultant for more than 40 years, I have observed and participated in jury
 17 selection in hundreds of cases. It is clear to me that it is a difficult task to talk about highly
 18 sensitive subjects and to reveal bias, especially implicit biases, during voir dire, for as Justice Mosk
 19 observed, “bias deceives its holder.” (People v. Williams, 29 Cal.3d 392 (1981)).

1 14. Social science tells us that these types of attitudes are very resistant to change, and
2 will have a significant impact on juror decision-making, regardless of how conscientiously the juror
3 approaches his or her job.¹ As the situation in the LaCaze case illustrates, jurors are not always
4 forthcoming even about undisputable facts and circumstances in their lives, such as their own
5 experience working with law enforcement, let alone what attitudes they may hold. To select a jury
6 that will base its decision on the law and evidence, jurors with strong attitudes and pertinent
7 experiences must be identified. Without an effective juror questionnaire and attorney conducted
8 voir dire, it is highly likely that jurors with strong bias will be seated—and that no one will ever
9 know.

10 15. An effective juror questionnaire goes a long way toward revealing pertinent
11 experiences and attitudes. It places questions squarely before every juror and seeks answers not just
12 from those willing to speak before others in open court. The questionnaire provides a relatively
13 protected opportunity in which jurors may express their experience with and attitudes about a
14 variety of sensitive issues, including alcohol dependence, drug use and dependence, homelessness,
15 and lawsuits, including lawsuits against law enforcement. Questionnaires effectively address the
16 frequent problem that those who serve on juries are the ones attorneys and the court know the least
17 about, as can often happen when the sole source of information is judge conducted voir dire, and the
18 information about perspective jurors dwindles as time wears on in voir dire.

19 16. There is a general agreement amongst social scientists that self-reports about bias
20 and prejudice and the manner and extent to which they affect one's actions and decisions are highly
21 unreliable.² Jurors' natural desire to appear fair and impartial diminishes candor in open court when
22 they suspect that the answer may disqualify them. This tendency is heightened when the Court
23 conducts the voir dire examination.³ Jurors perceive the authority of the Court and receive the
24 implicit message that to be "good" citizens they must say they can set aside their biases and
25 prejudices, and follow the law, without knowing whether they are truly capable of doing so.
26 Unfortunately, such blanket assertions are often naive and hollow. In Irwin v. Dowd (1960) 366
27 U.S. 717, 759, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized what is referred to as "demand characteristics"

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¹ Jost, J. Resistance to Change: A Social Psychological Perspective, *Social Research* Vol. 82, No. 3; (2015); Howe, L. et al., *Attitude Strength*, *Annual Review of Psychology* (2017) 68:237-51

² Sue, S., et al., *Authoritarianism, Pretrial Publicity and Awareness of Bias in Simulated Jurors*, 37 *Psychol. Reports* 1299, 1302 (1975).

³ Jones, *Judges-versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation on Juror Candor*, 11 *Law and Human Behavior* 131, 143 (1987).

1 or psychological processes present during jury selection which lead biased jurors to pronounce their
2 ability to be fair:

3 No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to
4 petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is
often its father.

5 17. It has been well documented in numerous studies (including our book, Jurywork:
6 Systematic Techniques) that many jurors enter the courtroom with strong and often fixed beliefs
7 and concerns that they may have held for their entire adult life. These beliefs are so deeply seated
8 and strongly held that they are certain to influence jury behavior in several significant ways.

9 18. Social science research devoted to explaining the dynamics of human behavior in
10 public situations is instructive in evaluating the effectiveness of various voir dire procedures. This
11 research indicates that the quality of information obtained in any interview is controlled by the
12 conditions under which the interview is conducted, the type of information sought, and the
interview subject's perceptions of the interview's end results.

13 19. For example, when they are aware of being evaluated, most people become
14 concerned with their performance. This concern, sometimes called evaluation apprehension,
15 influences the responses people give.⁴ Even without intending to do so, people devote considerable
16 attention to learning what factors have a positive influence on how they are received or evaluated,
17 and they adopt behavior that will enable them to leave a potentially embarrassing situation as
quickly as possible.⁵

18 20. In the context of voir dire, fairness and impartiality are the most positive or socially
19 desirable characteristics to be portrayed. The tendency of individuals to portray themselves in the
20 most socially desirable light, e.g., fair rather than unfair, honest rather than dishonest, is well
21 documented in the social science literature.⁶

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25 ⁴ E.g., *When Dissonance Fails: On Eliminating Evaluation Apprehension from Attitude Measurement*, 1
Journal of Social Psychology 28 (1965).

26 ⁵ Arkin, *Social Anxiety, Self-Presentation and the Self-Service Bias in Causal Attribution*, 38 Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 23 (1980).

27 ⁶ E.g., Marlow and Crown, *Social Desirability and Response to Perceived Situational Demands*, 25 Journal
28 of Consulting Psychology 109 (1968).

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2 21. This tendency increases with the social distance of the interviewer from the subject
3 and with the presence of others at the interview. Thus, when voir dire questioning is conducted by
4 the judge only, jurors increase efforts to please the interviewer (judge) or conform to what they
believe the interviewer expects.

5 22. Many aspects of voir dire prevent jurors from giving frank and open responses to the
6 questions asked. First, the courtroom is an intimidating place for most prospective jurors who are
7 often unaccustomed to and uncomfortable with speaking in front of large groups as they must
8 during voir dire. Jurors are fully aware that they will be included or excluded from the jury based
9 upon their answers to the questions asked, and such a setting is likely to inhibit many jurors from
responding frankly and openly.

10 23. Many aspects of the large group voir dire inhibit jurors and deter candor. A report
11 prepared for the Administrative Office of the Courts of California by the National Center for State
12 Courts in 2004⁷ noted:

13 ... studies have suggested that the relative intimacy of the voir dire setting has an effect on
14 juror candor, with jurors providing more candid information when they are questioned individually
15 rather than as part of the entire panel. Judge Gregory E. Mize (ret.) reported on particularly striking
16 results with this technique while serving on the D.C. Superior Court. In 1999, Judge Mize wrote that
nearly 20% of “silent jurors” – that is, prospective jurors who failed to disclose information during
voir dire with the entire panel – nevertheless disclosed case-relevant information when given an
opportunity to do so in the relative intimacy of individual voir dire.

17 24. Mize reported that in the course of some 30 trials using this technique that in 90% of
18 these trials between one and four of these previously silent jurors expressed bias sufficient to led to
19 a removal for cause.⁸

20 25. Second, juror responses during voir dire are influenced by what the juror believes the
21 trial judge expects and wishes to hear. Psychological studies indicate that subjects avoid
22 contradicting or displeasing an interviewer who is perceived as having higher social status than the
23 subject.⁹ In the courtroom, the judge is the most highly respected authority figure, and

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25 ⁷ Hannaford-Agor, P.L. *Examining Voir Dire in California*, Prepared for the Administrative Office
of the Courts (August 2004) p. 4-5.

26 ⁸ Mize, G.E. (1999). *On better jury selection: Spotting UFO jurors before they enter the jury room*,
Connecticut Review Spring, 33.

27 ⁹ NJP Litigation Consulting, Krauss & Wiley (eds), *Jurywork: Systematic Techniques*, Thomson Reuters,
28 Eagan, MN, 2013, Sections 2:2 and 2:3.

1 consequently, jurors attempt to give responses that they believe the judge will approve. In short,
2 judge-conducted voir dire can inadvertently encourage prospective jurors to tailor their responses to
3 what they perceive is the relevant judicial attitude, rather than expressing their own convictions.¹⁰

4 26. Third, the expressed attitudes of prospective jurors are often affected by what they
5 learn about the beliefs of other jurors. In a group situation, many people will respond in what they
6 perceive as a socially appropriate manner instead of simply speaking truthfully. This tendency is
7 reinforced by the unfamiliar and highly formal atmosphere that a courtroom presents to most
8 prospective jurors. Under such conditions of unfamiliarity and uncertainty, the tendency to conform
9 as closely as possible to the behavior of others is undeniably strong.

10 27. Fourth, voir dire frequently focuses on very personal issues about which jurors are
11 sometimes hesitant to speak publicly. Subjected to public scrutiny in the presence of a large and
12 unfamiliar audience, potential jurors tend to respond by minimizing the information disclosed. In
13 addition, jurors will often adjust or disguise their responses, either to match those of other
14 individuals in the group or to obtain what they perceive as the approval of the court.

15 28. When the judge conducts the *voir dire*, it sometimes consists of leading questions
16 which cause prospective jurors to readily agree. When a judge asks a prospective juror, "You can
17 be fair and impartial, can't you?" the obvious appropriate answer is, "Yes." Few jurors ever dare to
18 disagree. Social science studies have repeatedly shown that jurors are acutely aware of even the
19 subtlest cues or indications from the judge. Fearing the court's disapproval, jurors will usually
20 respond to the court's queries in a manner they believe is acceptable to the court without considering
21 their own individual, personal and honest responses.¹¹

22 29. The Supreme Court noted:

23 The influence of the trial judge on the jury "is necessarily and properly of great weight"
24 and "[the] lightest word or intimation is received with deference and may prove controlling."

25 Oeurcia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470, 53 S. Ct. 698, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1321 (1933).

26 ¹⁰ L.L. Marshall & A. Smith, *The Effects of Demand Characteristics, Evaluation Anxiety, and Expectancy on*
27 *Juror Honesty During Voir Dire*, 120 J. Psychol. No. 3, at 205 (1986).

28 ¹¹ Note, *Judges' Non-Verbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to Judicial Impartiality*, 61 Va. L.
Rev. 1266 (1975); see Broeder, *Examinations: An Empirical Study*, 38 S. Cal. L. Rev. 503, 506, 513
(1965) and the discussion contained in G. Mize & P. Hannaford-Agor, *Building a Better Voir Dire*
Process, 47 The Judges' Journal No. 1 (ABA, Winter, 2008).

1 30. Jurors' self-assessment of their impartiality is inherently unreliable, which heightens
2 the importance of an effective voir dire so that jurors with actual or implied biases can be identified
3 and then excused through cause challenges. This requires obtaining honest answers and sufficient
4 information during voir dire. Attorney participation in voir dire is a more effective tool for eliciting
5 bias than questioning conducted by the judge alone. The social distance between the questioner and
6 the prospective jurors is reduced, and jurors may feel less inhibited about offering more candid
7 responses to an attorney. Furthermore, the judge cannot have the same interest in discerning juror
8 bias as does an adversary, and the adversaries may be more sensitive to those juror responses which
9 may need follow-up inquiry. In addition, the trial judge is obviously less familiar with the evidence
10 and case theories than are the parties. In United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1977),
11 the Court stated:

12 A judge cannot have the same grasp of the facts, the complexities and nuances as the
13 trial attorneys entrusted with the preparation of the case. The court does not know the
14 strength and weakness of each litigant's case. Justice requires that each lawyer be given an
15 opportunity to ferret out possible bias and prejudice of which the juror himself may be
16 unaware until certain facts are revealed.

17 31. There are good reasons that attorney-conducted voir dire is the standard practice in
18 most state courts. Social science research demonstrates that attorneys are more effective than
19 judges in eliciting candid self-disclosure from potential jurors.¹² Attorney-conducted voir dire
20 minimizes the pressure to conform to a set of perceived judicial standards that arises due to
21 questions from the judge. In one study, subjects changed their answers almost twice as much when
22 questioned by a judge as when interviewed by an attorney.¹³

23 32. There is no substitute for attorney participation in voir dire in combination with a
24 thorough voir dire questionnaire. The questionnaire proposed by the plaintiff provides jurors with
25 relative privacy in responding to questions, promotes candor and allows the court and counsel to
26 efficiently identify jurors who may hold attitudes which should be probed for cause. The trial
27 attorneys, for the plaintiff and defense, have worked hundreds of hours for years and are thoroughly
28 familiar with the case issues, themes, nuances, parties, facts, issues, law and witnesses of a case.

12 Suggs, David & Sales, Bruce D. (1981). *Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis*. Indiana Law Journal, 56, 367-288 and Williams, J. Allen (1968), *Interviewer Role Performance: A Further Note on Bias in the Information Interview*, Public Opinion Quarterly, 32, 287-294.

13 Jones, "Judge-Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire," 2 Law and Human Behavior 131 (1987).

1 That familiarity places them in the best position to meaningfully inquire about jurors' attitudes and
2 life experiences which the case may tap. In Harold v. Corwin, 846 F.2d 1148 (1988), Lay, Chief
3 Judge, concurring wrote:

4 The grave danger of a voir dire controlled solely by the judge is found in the
5 unnecessary reversal of cases where the judge offers allegedly neutral, flat and non-
6 penetrating questions to potential jurors. Where the judge alone conducts the voir dire it
7 generally provides a paucity of information to allow a judgmental exercise for peremptory
8 challenges by counsel.... (See United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 198 (5th Cir.1978); United
9 States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908 (8th Cir.1974); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340,
10 366-70 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 1443, 35 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973);
11 United States v. Banks, 687 F.2d 967, 982 (7th Cir.1982) (Swygert, J., dissenting) ('trial
12 judge[']s questions [were] general, rhetorical [and] totally insufficient. '); see also United States
13 v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152, 153-54 (6th Cir.1984) ('voir dire tends to be extensive and probing,
14 operating as a predicate for the exercise of peremptories, one of the most important of the
15 rights secured') (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, 13
16 L.Ed.2d 759 (1964)); United States v. Rossbach, 701 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir.1983) ('[a]
17 searching voir dire is a necessary incident to the right to an impartial jury') (citation omitted).

18 ...

19 any busy trial judge must candidly admit that he or she knows far less of a given case
20 at the time voir dire commences than the lawyers who have prepared the case for months or
21 years. This reason alone compels the conclusion that lawyers should participate in voir dire.

22 33. While attorney voir dire and juror questionnaires are the practice in most state courts
23 and addressed in California in the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP 222.5) it has also been permitted
24 in some Federal cases with which I am familiar and frequently in cases involving highly charged
25 issues including allegations of police abuse. In all six of the law enforcement abuse cases in the
26 Northern District referred to earlier (Espinosa, Hunter, Oliver, Smith, M.H., and May) attorney-
27 conducted voir dire was permitted. Attorney voir dire was also permitted in the matter of U.S. v.
28 Koon, et al. concerning officers charged with civil rights violations in the case involving Rodney
King.


33. Attorney-conducted voir dire combined with the information obtained in a juror
questionnaire can be both efficient and effective. However, it is necessary to provide enough time
in which to read and review all the juror questionnaires and prepare juror specific follow-up
questions. Based on the information contained in the questionnaire, attorneys from both sides may
be able to agree in advance of voir dire to excuse some number of jurors who express bias or other
concerning information, saving in-court time. This can be accomplished without any loss of court
time by having jurors complete the questionnaires on a Friday and return for voir dire on Monday or

1 Tuesday, allowing the attorneys to work with the questionnaires over the weekend. This schedule
2 has worked well in my experience. Attorney-conducted voir dire does not necessarily take more
3 time than court-conducted voir dire. This was noted in the Report of the Federal Judicial Center,
4 *Conduct of the Voir Dire Examination: Practices and Opinions of Federal District Judges (1977)*,
5 page 14. Quite clearly any abuse of voir dire by counsel can be eliminated by supervision by the
6 court. At a minimum, I suggest that attorneys be permitted to conduct some voir dire with the entire
7 panel and suggest that each side be permitted two hours to follow-up with individual jurors where
8 an issue or cause has emerged during the voir dire conducted either by the court or counsel.

9 35. In the course of my work, I have reviewed voir dire transcripts, new trial motions
10 and appellate briefs in which issues have emerged where particularly salient and prejudicial
11 information about a juror's background was not uncovered in voir dire. In my experience large
12 group voir dire and/or voir dire conducted by the court or counsel which is not probing, runs the risk
13 of permitting jurors to withhold important information.

14 36. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration. If called upon to
15 testify to same, I am competent to do so. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
16 United States and the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, except as to those
17 matters stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

18 Executed the 3rd day of Oct., 2023 at Oakland California.

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21 Lois P. Heaney